All In

Worth repeating:

No, that was not the stake.  At stake was another bailout of Greece. On top of debt forgiveness.  On top of a moratorium.

Greece is structurally incapable of retiring its debt in the next ten, twenty, or thirty years.   Greece is structurally incapable of generating sufficient revenues, no matter what level of austerity is applied, to meet more than a fraction of the costs of the "plan of four pillars."

Syriza's game, such as it was, was to capitalize its weakness. Literally.  Somewhere along the line, they believed not only their own μαλακίες, but the bollocks of others that if you owe enough, it's not your problem, it's the lenders. 

So let's pick up the thread of development again.  Syriza thinks it holds the trump cards in its empty hand.  Syriza believes its empty hand is the trump card.  Syriza can adjust, backdown, compromise, resubmit proposal after proposal because it has its eyes on the prize-- another bailout necessary to keep it functioning in the Eurozone.

The Troika recognizes the game for what it is.  It's determining strategy is to avoid another bailout.  It must avoid another bailout or the ESFS [European Financial Stability Facility] would be...depleted.  ESFS exposure to Greece is estimated at €141 billion,  about 30 percent of the mechanism's lending capacity, and 20 percent of the total guarantees made by the eurozone member states.  Germany, France provide half the guarantee total, with Italy and Spain providing another 30 percent.  Any new bailout of Greece would have to retire the old debt, meaning either the debt gets redeemed by the mechanism, or its guarantors.

The Troika has its eyes on the prize also, and that prize is Italy where debt loads are too large to be guaranteed by the ESFS; where the economy, having experienced triple-dip recessions cannot afford to meet further commitments to the stability facility.  The Troika knows what's at stake; what's essential to the functioning of the block of the European bourgeoisie.  And it ain't Greece.  Never has been.

Syriza has requested another bailout.  It is not going to happen.  Schäuble plays this game better than Varoufakis, Tsipras, and all the radical political economists put together, because he recognizes it isn't a game.  At stake is Italy.  Listen up, Renzi: the continued devastation of Greece is the object lesson of a European Union of capital, for a European Union of capital, by a European Union of capital. 

Now that's the "front page" story.  The back story is coming to grips with the grinding defeat facilitated by Syriza.  So......all in.
 

1. I think I was one of the first to draw an analogy, or a parallel between Syriza and Allende's UP government in Chile. That being said, Tsipras wouldn't make a pimple on Allende's ass, and Syriza (with its bogus Thessaloniki program of a "new New Deal" and one more Marshall plan), in comparison to the Socialist Party of Chile of that time wouldn't even make it into the "left" category. Syriza was, is, and remains a consciously pro-capitalist formation, of by and for continued domination of capital. Allende, and the Socialist Party of Chile were not.

2. The UP government was elected by a workers' upsurge whereas Syriza gained its credibility by demonstrating how effective it could be in pre-empting demonstrations, strikes; channeling struggle into "democratic expressions" of support for the European Union, and Greece's "partnership" with EU capitalism.

3. The "left" outside of Syriza has to come to grips with its uncritical support for an explicitly pro-capitalist formation. Moreover, the "left" outside of Syriza has to come to grips with the failure of the left platform within Syriza-- that it registered only 2 "no" votes against the Tsipras proposals. All other "no" votes came from...........the fascists and the KKE.

4. The "left" is organically incapable of confronting either issue.


5. Advocating demonstrations against the government (which government will be out of office shortly) has its role, purpose, and function, and part of those is facilitating, and covering, efforts to building an underground apparatus that can protect militants, workers, immigrants from the repression, and the assaults from official and unofficial sources that are sure to follow.

July 11, 2012 

No, that was not the stake.  At stake was another bailout of Greece. On top of debt forgiveness.  On top of a moratorium.

Greece is structurally incapable of retiring its debt in the next ten, twenty, or thirty years.   Greece is structurally incapable of generating sufficient revenues, no matter what level of austerity is applied, to meet more than a fraction of the costs of the "plan of four pillars."

Syriza's game, such as it was, was to capitalize its weakness. Literally.  Somewhere along the line, they believed not only their own μαλακίες, but the bollocks of others that if you owe enough, it's not your problem, it's the lenders. 

So let's pick up the thread of development again.  Syriza thinks it holds the trump cards in its empty hand.  Syriza believes its empty hand is the trump card.  Syriza can adjust, backdown, compromise, resubmit proposal after proposal because it has its eyes on the prize-- another bailout necessary to keep it functioning in the Eurozone.

The Troika recognizes the game for what it is.  It's determining strategy is to avoid another bailout.  It must avoid another bailout or the ESFS [European Financial Stability Facility] would be...depleted.  ESFS exposure to Greece is estimated at €141 billion,  about 30 percent of the mechanism's lending capacity, and 20 percent of the total guarantees made by the eurozone member states.  Germany, France provide half the guarantee total, with Italy and Spain providing another 30 percent.  Any new bailout of Greece would have to retire the old debt, meaning either the debt gets redeemed by the mechanism, or its guarantors.

The Troika has its eyes on the prize also, and that prize is Italy where debt loads are too large to be guaranteed by the ESFS; where the economy, having experienced triple-dip recessions cannot afford to meet further commitments to the stability facility.  The Troika knows what's at stake; what's essential to the functioning of the block of the European bourgeoisie.  And it ain't Greece.  Never has been. - See more at: http://thewolfatthedoor.blogspot.com/#sthash.ZPKgP7hb.dpuf

No, that was not the stake.  At stake was another bailout of Greece. On top of debt forgiveness.  On top of a moratorium.

Greece is structurally incapable of retiring its debt in the next ten, twenty, or thirty years.   Greece is structurally incapable of generating sufficient revenues, no matter what level of austerity is applied, to meet more than a fraction of the costs of the "plan of four pillars."

Syriza's game, such as it was, was to capitalize its weakness. Literally.  Somewhere along the line, they believed not only their own μαλακίες, but the bollocks of others that if you owe enough, it's not your problem, it's the lenders. 

So let's pick up the thread of development again.  Syriza thinks it holds the trump cards in its empty hand.  Syriza believes its empty hand is the trump card.  Syriza can adjust, backdown, compromise, resubmit proposal after proposal because it has its eyes on the prize-- another bailout necessary to keep it functioning in the Eurozone.

The Troika recognizes the game for what it is.  It's determining strategy is to avoid another bailout.  It must avoid another bailout or the ESFS [European Financial Stability Facility] would be...depleted.  ESFS exposure to Greece is estimated at €141 billion,  about 30 percent of the mechanism's lending capacity, and 20 percent of the total guarantees made by the eurozone member states.  Germany, France provide half the guarantee total, with Italy and Spain providing another 30 percent.  Any new bailout of Greece would have to retire the old debt, meaning either the debt gets redeemed by the mechanism, or its guarantors.

The Troika has its eyes on the prize also, and that prize is Italy where debt loads are too large to be guaranteed by the ESFS; where the economy, having experienced triple-dip recessions cannot afford to meet further commitments to the stability facility.  The Troika knows what's at stake; what's essential to the functioning of the block of the European bourgeoisie.  And it ain't Greece.  Never has been. - See more at: http://thewolfatthedoor.blogspot.com/#sthash.ZPKgP7hb.dpuf

Get Ready

The Guardian is reporting that the Hellenic Parliament has adopted Alexis "Ain't Too Proud to Beg" Tsipras' latest proposals for "economic adjustment." The report identifies 250 votes "for," 32 votes "against," and 8 abstentions.  Ten members apparently didn't show up. 

It appears from the tally that Syriza party MPs accounted for all of the abstentions, seven of the no-shows, and only two of the "no" votes.  So much for the "left platform," of which so much was made, in which was placed so much hope, just as before so much was made of and so much hope was placed in Syriza itself.  

So Tsirpas has rendered his (near) final services to the maintenance of Greek and European capitalism-- a)proving the insignificance, irrelevance of "left platform" formations; how they embody all the sterling qualities--equivocation, bluster, duplicity, cowardice-- of the broader electoral alliance in which they participate;  b) removing any further need for his government and his party to exist; and c)setting the stage for eclipse, dispersal, and probable suppression of parliament itself as protests, temporarily quelled by Syriza's election, move back into the streets, as the economy resumes its death spiral, as the police and the military find themselves reinvigorated by capital's  demand for "Order!". 

I'm guessing that the "no" votes were cast by the KKE (Greek Communist Party) and XA (Golden Dawn), at least that's  what I come up with from the numbers.  The KKE has 12 seats, and Golden Dawn has 17, and maybe there's one, but probably only one ANEL MP who voted no. 

So now what happens?  First, the struggle is now as it always has been-- extra-parliamentary.  Golden Dawn has been expanding and consolidating its extra-parliamentary gangs, and extra-parliamentary activity-- everything from collecting "protection" money to providing medical treatment for Greeks only-- throughout the memorandum period. 

"Responsible action" by Marxists requires, first and foremost, construction of an underground network, embedded in working class areas that can protect activists, organizers, immigrants from official and unofficial repression.

That's a good enough place for a start.

July 10, 2015

And now......

And now, the struggle in Greece becomes much more difficult, and much more dangerous.  The bankruptcy of the "old parties"-- PASOK and New Democracy, and the demoralization of the poor, the workers, the pensioners, those working in community medical clinics in order to try and maintain some social welfare,  by Syriza's capitulation will lead to an upsurge by the worst of the right, by the fascists. 

All the forces of repression are looking forward to a Golden Dawn.  The forces of repression have been handed an opportunity that only Syriza, in its abject incompetence, its "game-playing" could create.   

That, dear comrades, is exactly why I have been so stridently critical of Syriza and its leftist cheerleaders.

July 10, 2015

The Five Stages of Leftism

                                                               When No Means Yes

1. Denial

I don't believe it.  This can't be real.  I just spoke with/saw him/her/they/it and he/she/they/it looked so good. The doctors, and doctorates, were optimistic.  He/she/it/they promised.  Ignore the papers, ignore the press.  Put cotton in your ears.  Don't say another word, I'm not listening.

2. Anger 

Son-of-a-bitch.  Bastard.  Fuck me.  How could he/she/they/it do something like that?  Traitor(s). Coward(s).  It's all the fault of those damn ________ (fill in the blank: possible choices-- bankers, Stalinists, Stalinists and bankers, Trotskyists, anarchists, black bloc, PhDs, professors, Americans, Germans, German-Americans, German-American Stalinist PhD banker professors).

3. Bargaining

Look, slow down.  Maybe it isn't all that bad. OK, we agree to the terms, the banks reopen, the money returns, we get some debt reduction, then maybe the economy recovers, and when it recovers we push through certain legislation to modify the program.

4.  Depression

Jesus, this is just terrible.  And so sudden.  You know what, I give up.  I just give up.  I can't even get interested in movies any longer.  We worked so hard. We had so much going for us.  All that effort.  That big turnout.  That humungous vote. I just don't know if I have it in me to go on any longer.  I'm going back to school.  I'm going back to teaching.  I'm going back to on-line gambling.

5.  Acceptance

Yes, it's bad.  Yes it hurts.  What can you do?  We fought the good fight.  So we lost. These things happen.  We were never really that strong.  Things just didn't work out, this time.  But look, life goes on.  There's my family and my friends, and my teaching.  And on-line gambling.  And we'll be wiser for the experience.  We won't make the same mistakes again. There will be other opportunities in the future, and we'll do it right.  Look how popular Podemos is in Spain.  I feel better already. Spain, that's the ticket.   Yeah, in a couple of weeks, I'll be ready to get right back into it and start stumping for Podemos.  Hit me, dealer. Blackjack!!


July 9, 2015

FWIW

1.Others, not myself of course, might regard the comments, prognostications, predictions, assertions, of the pro-Syriza "leftists" of the international internet brigade with more seriousness if they bothered to learn the English transliteraton for the name of Greece's current prime minister.

Τσίπρας becomes T-S-I-P-R-A-S.  TSIPRAS, not TSIRPAS.  That's how he spells it on his webpage.

2. Meanwhile, the Gang that Can't Spell Straight is happily proclaiming that "Greek workers vote NO to austerity."  Technically not.  They voted 'no' to the terms as last proposed by the EU finance ministers, and backed up of course by the EU primer ministers, the ECB, etc. etc.  They voted in support of T-S-I-P-R-A-S' claim that two days after the 'no' vote, he will have secured a better deal.

3."A better deal" will be  within the framework of concessions that T-S-I-P-R-A-S has already made, which as the Gang has so frequently pointed out, is the best Greece can do, and is so much better than actually rejecting austerity, which would involve certain dramatic actions made by  new actors in this currently sorry play. 

4. No "better deal" will be obtained without recapitalizing the Greek banks.  The European Union will not recapitalize the Greek banks without T-S-I-P-R-A-S agreeing to some form of bail-in-- that's B-A-I-L  I-N.

5. No matter how badly you may misspell T-S-I-P-R-A-S, it means the same thing it meant before the referendum:  λιτότητα

July 6, 2015

We Interrupt This Referendum, Part 2

1. Tearing away, just for the moment, from Thunderdome on the Aegean--"Break a deal; face the wheel"-- there's the island commonwealth, Puerto Rico, part of the United States when that's convenient and lucrative for the Federal government; and not part of the United States when it's not convenient.  Like now.  When it has $72 billion in debt that the commonwealth acknowledges cannot be serviced.  Then...then Puerto Rico is a special case.  It reports statistical information to the US Department of Commerce and the Federal Reserve, but it gets its own country page on the World Bank website; and it gets its own statistical database.

Puerto Rico's economy gets a critical, and helpful. look from the Federal Reserve.   It  gets another critical, but helpful, always helpful,  report, authored by Anne Krueger (formerly of the IMF, and currently married to Freddy),  Ranjit Teja, and Andrew Wolfe (no relation). These reports tell us what went wrong and what to do about it.  That's what makes them so helpful.

Anyone can point out after all, that labor force participation rate for the population in Puerto Rico aged 24-54 is at about 43 percent vs. 63 percent for the mainland USA.  Anyone can point out that GDP growth since the end of the official recession in 2009, has been less than 1/4 of that on the mainland.  Anyone can point out that manufacturing, seizing the incentives of Federal tax breaks that ended some years ago, began to close shops in the recession of 2001.  Anyone, even I, can tell you that the annual percentage change in fixed capital formation has slowed dramatically; turned negative in 2000; that the gross amounts have trended downwards over the last 10 years.

But it takes an economist to tell you the reason for these indicators of distress is that Puerto Rico's minimum wage is the same as the mainland's. 

2.  Puerto Rico isn't Greece.  Puerto Rico is not a sovereign country, cooking its books to join a monetary union.  Puerto Rico is not subject to balance of trade difficulties.  Puerto Rico isn't Greece, but capitalism is capitalism, and when capital attacks its "fixed" accumulated component, devaluing the means of production, closing shop, it necessarily must also attack its living component-- which happens to be the lives of those working and not working; the lives of the working poor and the unemployed poor whether in Europe, or Asia, or the Americas.

The Krueger report and NY Fed's report find that the fact that the minimum wage in Puerto Rico amounts to an obstacle to economic expansion, to labor market efficiency, investment, because unlike the mainland United States where the minimum wage is only equivalent of 28 percent of per capita income, the minimum wage amounts to 77 percent of the per capita income.  The minimum wage is just too close to the average wage, so, according to the economists, there is insufficient advantage to employing workers at the minimum wage.  You see, Puerto Rico is poor-- it has difficulty becoming "competitive," "expanding the economy," and most importantly servicing the debt-- because it isn't poor enough.  That's what economics amounts to: the ideology of poverty.

The solution?  Any economist can tell you the obvious solution.  Lower the minimum wage, of course.  Get an exemption from the federal minimum wage for Puerto Rico.  Sure thing, if only Puerto Rico were its own country, then this problem could be solved and with haste.

3.  What else?  Puerto Rico has established sponsored public sector corporations and authorities, empowered to issue bonds for raising revenue to invest in power generation, like the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, transport, like the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority.

Now as part of its program to make the island attractive to investors, the commonwealth reduced, and has maintained the reduction, of corporate and personal income taxes.  Taxes on corporate profits can be in the 0-4 percent per year bracket for as long as 15 years, and the benefit is renewable upon the expiration of the 15 year allotment. 

In order to undertake the upkeep and upgrade of infrastructure essential to the production and circulation of capital, power and transportation, these authorities have to issue bonds, and the bonds have to be collateralized by a portion of the revenues generated by the fees charged to the corporate users of the power and transportation infrastructure.   Reduce the fees, either "actively" or "structurally" be intentional action, or "passively" "organically" by a decline in economic activity and guess what?  The revenue stream is inadequate to service the debt and sustain the infrastructure.

The solution?  Of course, restrain the public sector corporations and allow "private competition" to access the networks built by these authorities so that the private competition can charge lower user fees.   This is nothing but the latest iteration of the "Washington Consensus" that tells us all things are better with private enterprise.  That's the ideology.  The practicality of course is that privatization leads to decay of networks (Railtrack, anyone?).  The practicality is that in periods of economic downturn and distress, private enterprise engages in asset stripping, asset liquidation.  Anyone other than an economist can tell you that.

4.  So before we return to Greece, where the population has decided to foot one more business class ticket to Brussels for Tsipras and co., let's just be clear what's going on here:  there is no such thing as economics.  There is capitalism and its ideologues.  There is the class struggle, however horribly muted, disorganized, seemingly feeble, against capital's reproduction of its slasher self.

Oh...and Alexis?  That ticket is one way, no returns.

July 5, 2015

We Interrupt This Referendum, Part 1

Here's all we need to know about the difference between voting "όχι" or "ναί" on the referendum in Greece:  a "no" vote means, in the words of the current prime minister, "I can assure you that the next day, I will be in Brussels and there will be a deal;" a "yes" vote means that the next day the replacement prime minister will be promising to go to Brussels and secure a deal.

Meanwhile, the poor, literally, Greek people-- the working poor, the unemployed poor, the pensioned poor, the unpensioned poor, the urban poor, the rural poor-- should, no matter which way the vote goes, say hello to their little friend... Cyprus.

The Greek banks require capitalization.  Capitalization means money.  It can come from "equity" arrangement; it can from debt issuance; and/or it can come from seizing the money that actually belongs to somebody else, that somebody else being the depositors.  Clearly, nobody is going to subscribe to an offering of stock in the Greek banks.  Just as clearly, the Greek banks cannot issue debt in the capital markets, and the Greek government requires its own recapitalization in the form of issuing short-term notes to the Greek banks in exchange for euros. 

No recapitalization of the Greek banks, which are tied hand foot to the ECB system, will be forthcoming without there first being a bail-in, a seizure of a portion of the deposits that the banks supposedly hold in trust, a trust guaranteed by...well not by the ECB since the monetary union is nowhere near that unified, but rather by the Greek government.  

Given that government's deliberate delay in imposing capital controls. the big account holders, with the big money,  have already moved significant portions of their funds outside the jurisdiction of the government.  That leaves....everybody else.  That leaves maybe 10 million (I'm guessing) or so people whose individual accounts average (and I'm merely guessing) €13,000 who are about to get a haircut by Jack the Ripper that will take the average account size down to about €9000.  How's that for sticking it to the IMF, the ECB, the European Commission?

Some people call that a haircut. Some people call the referendum "democracy."  Democracy is when "no" and "yes" mean the same thing.

The  "no" that matters is the "no" to Syriza's deluded pretensions at "negotiatons."  The  "no" that matters is the "no" to Syriza's delusions of actually being a government.  The "no" that matters is the "yes" to repudiating the debt in its entirety. 

July 5, 2015